

Do fiscal policies influence educated young voters? Empirical evidence from Finland

Takis Venetoklis
University of Turku

We examine Finnish university students' fiscal policy preferences and how they are associated with their voting behaviour in two consecutive parliamentary elections, 2003 and 2007. Data is collected through an internet based survey. The study utilises a very large number of responses (N=33320) of students from all disciplines, in all higher education establishments of the country. Fiscal policy preferences are operationalized with questions on budgetary appropriations allocated towards several Ministries. Pair wise comparisons among loyal student voters of all parties and students that changed their vote in the latter election, indicate that several fiscal policies affect significantly the voting behaviour of the population under scrutiny.

Keywords: Voting behaviour, public opinion, fiscal policies, internet surveys

Introduction

How do people vote? What are the determinants that cause a person to vote for a particular party? Why some people stay loyal to the same party and others shift their vote? These questions have always puzzled political and social scientists. Voters as individuals interact with the environment all the time. Thus their decisions and behaviour in some ways are conducted

“...in areas where the state is responsible for defining the terms of such interaction and the means by which this takes place. Health-care; unemployment benefit; income support; housing; rules of the economic market; policing; justice – all are goods and services whose provision is defined through a framework put in place and amended by the incumbent government under the auspices of the state.” (Evans, 2004, 92–93).

In attempting to identify determinants of voting behaviour, a good starting point is examining loyal voters. As the model of the Michigan school suggests (Campbell et al., 1960; Harrop & Miller, 1987, 132) party identification plays a major role in determining which party to vote for. The assumption is that by consistently voting for a particular party, loyal voters endorse policies that the party advocates. The consensus nowadays is, however, that most voters do not identify with parties, but rather, are “independent”. For Finland, Papageorgiou (2010, 224) argues that

“...in 2003, the Finnish National Election Study revealed that the majority of Finnish voters are independents.”

If loyal voters still exist but party identification is not a major reason in their voting behaviour anymore, what other factors influence their choice? The Rochester Rational school of thought, in the tradition of Antony Downs (1957), asserts that voters are aware of the policy options that each party represents and choose to vote based on purely utility criteria, or how well the vote will serve their needs. Whatever the angle, the bottom line is that policies – whether represented through a political party or a particular candidate – play a role in voter choice formulation. As Söderlund (2008, 219) notes ‘Voters become inclined to make competence-based evaluations and vote for candidates or parties they think are most successful in delivering policy outcomes’.

Having looked briefly at the connection between voting behaviour and policy considerations, it is interesting to investigate in more detail an important sub-group of the electorate, the young voters. A substantial part of the existing literature on voting choice and young voters deal with voting abstention and how this can be reversed through enhanced education (e.g. Denver & Hands, 1990; Egerton, 2002, Milligan et al., 2004; Henn et al., 2005; Glaeser et al., 2007; Youniss & Levine, 2009). We argue that young *active* voters, especially university students also deserve attention. Once they complete their studies, they are more likely to occupy administrative positions in the public and private sector. This gives them opportunities to participate and contribute in policy planning, formation and execution. Also if they continue to be active voters later, they help shape the outcomes of future elections. Research focusing on university students and voting preferences had been plentiful in the late 1950s and 1960s (Nogee & Levin, 1958; Lipset & Altbach, 1966; Crotty, 1967). Later the interest faded. Nowadays university students and their voting choices are examined as sub-groups

Takis Venetoklis is a Senior Researcher at the Department of Social Research, University of Turku. Address: Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Social Research, FI-20014 University of Turku, Finland.

within surveys of the general public, or as smaller samples within experimental settings for research on political preference formation (for an overview see Druckman, 2004).

Our hypothesis tests empirically the well documented assertion that policy issues influence the voting preferences of the electorate. We contribute to the aforementioned discussion by examining the voting behaviour of Finnish university students. We look into several policy determinants that potentially shape the students' voting choices in two consecutive parliamentary elections, 2003 and 2007. The policies examined are fiscal in nature and refer to Ministry expenditures. Data was gathered through an internet based survey in which more than 30000 university students participated from all higher education establishments in the country and from all available disciplines. Blais (2000) has found that the more one studies, the more informed or cognitive mobilised one is. In that respect, the potential voter has presumably the capacity to better judge implemented or planned policies as well as party positions on these policies. This implies that the effect of policy issues on the voting behaviour of the educated voter can be better isolated. As Elo & Rapeli (2010, 141) recently mentioned '...the levels of formal education is clearly the most important predictor of a person's level of structural political knowledge'.

We proceed as follows. Next we describe our data, the survey questions as well as the dependent and independent variables used. The section thereafter analyses and comments on the results of our regression models. The last section recaps and discusses our findings and their implications.

Description of data and variables utilised

The data was gathered via an internet based survey called FUSSEP¹. The target population was Finnish university students in the 20 higher education establishments of the country². The survey was conducted during each fall from 2005 to 2008. Here we examine data gathered from the survey's second round, in 2006. Out of 122391 potential respondents, 33320 valid answers were received, a 27.2 per cent response rate (Venetoklis, 2006). Actually, due to missing values in individual questions, the number of observations in the tables and regression models later on, are even lower. Thus, at first glance the response rate looks rather low.

However, it is natural to assume that the size of a survey questionnaire is negatively correlated with the response rate. Indeed, Venetoklis (2006) reports that in the FUSSEP survey questionnaire there were approximately 60 fields to respond to. In addition, according to Sheehan (2001), the response rate of internet based surveys had dropped from 61.5 per cent in 1986, to 24 per cent in 2000. Taking under consideration the above peculiarities of the survey, we find the response rate as adequate for our research purposes.

Finally, the data analysed is not a random sample of the population of all Finnish university students. In other words, selection bias could be an underlying problem. To partly account for this weakness, we conducted several simple comparisons between known background variables of respon-

dents and non-respondents (age, type of study and university), but did not observe major differences.

Dependent variable

In the questionnaire, among others, students were asked how they voted for the 2003 parliamentary elections and what were their voting intentions in the upcoming 2007 parliamentary elections. We chose to analyse those responses where the students reported voting for the eight parties in the Finnish Parliament, namely the National Coalition (Kokoomus), the True Finns (Perussuomalaiset), the Christian Democrats (Kd), the Swedish People's Party (Rkp), the Centre Party (Keskusta), the Social Democrats (Sdp), the Green League (Vihreät) and the Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto).

By cross-tabulating these two responses we built our dependent variable of interest (Table 1). We identified those students that reported voting for the same party during the two consecutive parliamentary elections 2003 and 2007³. We named these groups "loyal voters". They are located in the diagonal. Also, we classified those students that voted for a different party in 2007, that is changed their vote compared to 2003. We named these groups "new recruits" and are found in all other cells of Table 1, under each party column⁴.

Independent variables of interest

The students were also asked to state their preferences on the budgetary appropriations towards different Ministries. The assumption was that the responses on the direction of the allocated budgetary appropriations per Ministry can be used as proxies reflecting preferences on implemented government policies.

The budgetary appropriations referred to the funds given to twelve Finnish Ministries⁵ through the annual state budget. The student voters were asked whether they preferred the funds allocated to each Ministry to be reduced (=1), stay the same (=2), or increase (=3) during the next five to seven years. These responses constituted our independent variables of interest.

¹ (F)innish (U)niversity (S)tudents (S)ocio(E)conomic (P)references downloaded from <http://extranet.vatt.fi/fussepp/download/> (as at 10.04.2010).

² Since 2010 the number is 16 due to mergers.

³ The listing order of political parties is based on Benoit & Laver (2006). Accordingly the Finnish political parties' left - right placements (0 extreme left - 10 extreme right) in 2003 were as follows: Left Alliance (1.84); Green League (3.42); Social Democrats (3.89); Centre Party (5.79); Swedish People's Party (6.74); Christian Democrats (7.0); True Finns (7.58); National Coalition (7.68).

⁴ In Table 3 and in the section titled "Potential causality issues" below, we describe further the logic behind the coding and classification of these groups of student voters.

⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Interior, Defence, Finance, Education, Agriculture, Transportation and Communication, Trade and Industry, Social Policy and Health, Labour, Environment.

Table 1
Voting in 2003 and 2007 among Finnish University students

	2007								
2003	Left Alliance	Green League	Soc. Democrats	Centre Party	Swedish. P.P.	Christian. Dem.	True Finns	Nat. Coalition	Totals
Left Alliance	1 072	304	96	11	5	7	8	26	1 529
Green League	361	6 077	273	97	48	39	22	409	7 326
Soc. Democrats	110	336	1 689	45	14	25	13	257	2 489
Centre Party	36	203	66	2 343	9	53	40	443	3 193
Swedish. P.P.	11	60	11	6	679	7	0	72	846
Christian. Dem.	8	45	13	36	11	617	8	58	796
True Finns	3	5	3	9	0	3	78	21	122
Nat. Coalition	10	191	61	117	54	31	32	4 749	5 245
Totals	1 611	7 221	2 212	2 664	820	782	201	6 035	21 546

Note: Read totals left to right, votes in 2003; top to bottom, votes in 2007

Control variables

With our aforementioned choice of policy related variables we examine voting preferences of students voters from the spatial modellers' prism, the Rational school of thought. If we ignore nonetheless the Michigan socio-psychological model, our empirical analysis would probably produce biased results, and our subsequent regression models would end up under-specified (Macdonald et al., 1998). And this, because other non-policy factors (i.e. socio-economic characteristics), have been shown to associate with one's voting behaviour. Hence, the control variables we included in our models were *Age*, *Age*⁶, *Own social class and of parents*⁷, *Educational background and level of education*⁸, *Household income*⁹, *Father and mother voting preferences*¹⁰, *Gender*¹¹, *Interest in politics*¹².

Results of empirical analysis

The eight "loyal voter" groups identified in the diagonal of Table 1 form our basic dataset. To reiterate, our main research question is to find whether policy issues effect one's voting behaviour. We start by simply measuring the magnitude of policy preferences of these loyal voters and identify, to what extent they hold extreme or moderate preferences, when compared to each other. If we find significant differences this would reinforce our hypothesis that policy issues do matter.

In Table 2 we see that overall, students wish that budgetary appropriations are increased the most for Education (2.72) and Environmental (2.45) policies. Students also prefer that funds are cut for Defence (1.60) and Agriculture related policies (1.89). Comparing these figures amongst party loyal voters, it is evident that they diverge. In several instances, left wing party voters support considerable budgetary increases

for social type of policies, but moderate increases -or even cuts- in policies towards entrepreneurship and investments. The opposite happens with right wing party voters. For instance, this is clear for appropriations towards the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Policies and Health. The minimum and maximum preference values for these Ministry appropriations are found in the loyal voters of the Left Alliance and the National Coalition, two parties located at the edges of the left-right axis.

Also specific policies, indentifying with the basic political agenda of different parties are supported or rejected by their loyal voters, as expected. Note for instance, the appropriations geared towards the Ministry of the Environment (maximum support of 2.81 by the Green League loyal voters), the Ministry of Agriculture (maximum support of 2.23 by the Centre Party loyal voters¹³) or appropriations for Defence purposes. There, the Left Alliance loyal voters score the least (1.28) where as the True Finns loyal voters score the most points (2.31).

⁶ Evans (2004, 176); Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006, 592); Dalton (2000, 30); Sigel (1989)

⁷ Weatherford (1978, cited in Lewis-Beck 1988, 75)

⁸ Venetoklis (2007); Betz (1994)

⁹ Alvarez & Nagler (1995); Dunleavy (1979); Heath et al. (1993); Franklin & Page (1984)

¹⁰ Degutis (2000, 19); Evans (2003)

¹¹ Norris (2002, 90–91); Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006, 595, cited in Söderlund, 2008, 226–227)

¹² Dalton (1999); Chong & Druckman (2007a, 651)

¹³ The Finnish Centre party has traditionally represented farmers and enjoyed strong support in rural areas.

Table 2

Mean values of preferences on budgetary appropriations to Ministries among loyal voters (<2 indicates decrease; >2 indicates increase)

Ministry	Left Alliance	Green League	Soc. Democrats	Centre Party	Swedish. P.P.	Christian. Dem.	True Finns	Nat. Coalition	Total mean values
Foreign	1.94	1.99	1.92	1.79	2.01	1.78	1.56	1.92	1.92
Justice	2.06	2.03	2.07	2.03	2.19	2.01	2.07	2.12	2.07
Interior	2.06	2.01	2.13	2.13	2.07	2.08	2.31	2.09	2.07
Defence	1.28	1.33	1.61	1.85	1.63	1.78	2.24	1.86	1.60
Finance	1.78	1.78	1.86	1.84	1.86	1.77	1.84	1.91	1.83
Education	2.82	2.77	2.77	2.67	2.70	2.74	2.60	2.64	2.72
Agriculture	1.84	1.90	1.80	2.23	1.93	2.13	2.08	1.72	1.89
Transp./Comm.	2.03	2.04	2.15	2.20	2.19	2.06	2.19	2.22	2.13
Trade/Industry	1.74	1.81	1.95	2.03	2.06	1.80	1.89	2.18	1.96
Soc. Pol./Health	2.88	2.76	2.77	2.62	2.52	2.75	2.36	2.27	2.61
Labour	2.57	2.36	2.48	2.23	2.18	2.32	2.08	2.07	2.28
Environment	2.66	2.81	2.39	2.18	2.40	2.29	2.10	2.12	2.45

Potential causality issues

From the above it is evident that policy preferences of loyal student voters of the eight political parties diverge. Thus one might argue that, clearly, policy is associated with one's voting choice. However the causal direction of the statement is more difficult to substantiate. How can we find evidence indicating a stronger causal association between voting choice and the voters' policy preferences? Using our data we have formulated the following hypothesis. If policy issues influence student voters in their voting behaviour, then loyal voters of a party would have *more* similar policy preferences with the new voters (or new recruits) for that same party compared to the policy preferences of the new voters of all other parties.

Table 3 is the very similar to Table 1, but now highlighted to show the new comparisons made. Here we have divided the data into eight sets of groups - one per political party -, with each group consisting of three sub-categories: (a) the loyal voters for the party between 2003 and 2007, (b) the new recruits for the same party in 2007 and (c) all the other new recruits from all other parties in 2007. At the bottom we show the number of observations of the three sub-categories per political party. To test our hypothesis we needed to conduct two sets of comparisons and compare the results against each other. Since we have three groups related for each of our eight political parties, this calls for a multinomial logit regression (Dow & Endersby, 2004).

We applied the following model specification

$$\log\left(\frac{\text{prob}(\text{New voters of party "X" or of other parties})}{\text{prob}(\text{Loyal voter party "X", base})}\right) = \beta_{i0} + \beta_{i1}X_1 + \beta_{i2}X_2 + \dots + \beta_{i12}X_{12} + \gamma_{i1..11}C_{1..11}$$

where

$i = 3$ categories per party: (a) Loyal voters of party "X" (base); (b) New voters of party "X"; (c) New voters of all other parties

$\beta_{i1} \dots \beta_{i12}$ = coefficients of the 12 policy preference scores on Ministry appropriations $X_1 \dots X_{12}$

$\gamma_{1..} \dots \gamma_{11}$ = coefficients of 11 Control Variables (Age, Age Squared, Own Social Class, Parents' Social class, Educational Background, Educational Level, Household Income, Father's Voting, Mother' Voting, Gender, Interest in politics)

We run in total 96 models. That is, we used for each of the 8 parties the 12 Ministry appropriation preferences as our main independent variable of interest (8 parties x 12 appropriations). The basic category is always the loyal voters of the party "X" in question. We compared the basic category against the other two; against the new recruits for the same party and against all the other new recruits for all other parties. We examined whether the statistical significance and the sign of the coefficient reported in the first comparison for each policy preference *changed* in the second. We are interested in knowing how the coefficients of the two comparisons "behaved" on the same policy issue.

To comprehend better the different combinations of comparisons made, we built Table 4, a 2x2 square with four different comparison "Regimes". Regime (I) denotes that for a specific policy question, the loyal voters of party "X" have the same preferences, when compared *both* with the new recruits for all the other parties *and* the new recruits that voted for party "X". In this case all three groups "agree". Regime (II) denotes that for a specific policy issue, loyal voters of party "X" have statistically significant preference differences

Table 3
Loyal voters and new recruits between 2003 and 2007

2003	2007								Totals
	Left Alliance	Green League	Soc. Democrats	Centre Party	Swedish. P.P.	Christian. Dem.	True Finns	Nat. Coalition	
Left Alliance	1 072	304	96	11	5	7	8	26	1 529
Green League	361	6 077	273	97	48	39	22	409	7 326
Soc. Democrats	110	336	1 689	45	14	25	13	257	2 489
Centre Party	36	203	66	2 343	9	53	40	443	3 193
Swedish. P.P.	11	60	11	6	679	7	0	72	846
Christian. Dem.	8	45	13	36	11	617	8	58	796
True Finns	3	5	3	9	0	3	78	21	122
Nat. Coalition	10	191	61	117	54	31	32	4 749	5 245
Totals	1 611	7 221	2 212	2 664	820	782	201	6 035	21 546
Loyals 2003–2007	1 072	6 077	1 689	2 343	679	617	78	4 749	
New recruits 2007	539	1 144	523	321	141	165	123	1 286	
All other recruits	3 703	3 098	3 719	3 921	4 101	4 077	4 119	2 956	

Table 4
Regimes of comparisons on policy issues among loyal voters of a specific party and new recruits

		Loyal voters in 2003 and 2007 vs own recruits in 2007	
		statistical significant preferences	statistical insignificant preferences
Loyal voters in 2003 and 2007 vs all other recruits in 2007	statistical significant preferences	significant – significant (III)	significant – insignificant (II)
	statistical insignificant preferences	insignificant – significant (IV)	insignificant – insignificant (I)

Table 5
Comparison Regimes of preferences for budgetary appropriations among loyal voters and new recruits for all parties

Ministry	Left Alliance	Green League	Social Dem.	Centre Party	Swedish P. P.	True Finns	National Coalition	Regime (I)	Regime (II)	Regime (III)	Regime (IV)
Foreign	I	III	I	II	I	II	IV	4	2	1	1
Justice	I	IV	I	I	II	I	II	5	2	0	1
Interior	I	IV	I	II	I	II	I	5	2	0	1
Defence	II	III	II	II	I	II	III	1	5	2	0
Finance	I	I	IV	I	I	I	II	6	1	0	1
Education	I	II	I	III	I	I	I	6	1	1	0
Agriculture	I	I	II	III	I	II	III	3	3	2	0
Trans./Comm.	I	I	III	II	I	I	III	5	1	2	0
Trade/Industry	II	III	I	III	I	I	II	4	2	2	0
Soc.Pol/Health	III	II	II	I	I	I	III	3	3	2	0
Labour	II	II	III	I	I	I	II	4	3	1	0
Environment	II	III	III	II	I	I	III	2	3	3	0
								48	28	16	4
								50.00 %	29.17 %	16.67 %	4.17 %

with new recruits of other parties. These differences disappear when their preferences are compared to those of the new recruits of the same party “X”. Regime (III) reveals that there are differences of preferences on a specific policy issues between loyal voters of party X compared to all new recruits, irrespective of whether they vote for party X or not. Finally Regime (IV) says the exact opposite of Regime (II).

We assert that our hypothesis would be supported if Regime (II) “dominates” Regime (IV). With Regime (II) we would expect that if policy issues affect considerably one’s voting behaviour, the new recruits’ preferences would coincide with their new party’s loyal voters (Party X). On the other hand the preferences of all other new recruits that voted for other parties would differ when compared to party X’s loyal voters. If Regime (IV) were to dominate, it would create an oxymoron situation. It would imply that loyal voters of party X have the *same* policy preferences with new recruits that vote for *other* parties and, in addition, have *different* policy preferences with their own new recruits, who – *despite those preference policy differences* – vote for party X. Finally, Regimes (I) and (III) indicate that all the sub-groups either agree or disagree on policy issues, in both comparisons. We do not elaborate further on Regimes (I) and (III). It is expected that some voters, choose a particular party irrespective of the particular policy advocated by it.

Table 5 above shows in aggregate all the Regimes found in the 96 models run. The analysis supports well our hypothesis. Regime (II) indeed dominates Regime (IV); 29 per cent of all comparisons (28/96) indicate that loyal voters of all parties have different preferences with the voters that did not vote for that party and no differences with their own new voters. Only 4 per cent of comparisons (4/96) show the opposite¹⁴.

Conclusions

In this study we have examined whether voters are influenced by policy issues. Our target population has been Finnish university students. The data utilised was gathered in 2006 via an internet based survey called FUSSEP (Finnish University Students SocioEconomic Preferences). Students were asked whether they thought funds allocated to several Finnish ministries should stay the same, be reduced or increase. Since Ministries are the basic planners, implementers and monitors of policies and since policies require financing to be implemented, the assumption was that the opinions of the respondents on a particular ministry’ budgetary appropriations reflect their preferences on the policies themselves.

Results suggest that student voters hold unique preferences towards public policy issues and differ considerably based on the party which they vote for. Preferences on fiscal policies differ among loyal students voters of all eight parties examined. Although this indicates that policies influence one’s voting behaviour, it does not stand easily the causality test. To find such links we first compared policy preferences of a party’s loyal voters against new voters (or new recruits) for the same party. Then we compared policy preferences of loyal voters for one party against new voters of other parties.

Table 6

Comparison Regimes of preferences for budgetary appropriations among loyal voters for Centre party and new recruits for all parties

Ministry	Centre party loyal voters vs all other new recruits		Centre party loyal voters vs own recruits		Regime
	Coef.	P> z	Coef.	P> z	
Foreign	.2352701	0.003	.2311941	0.105	(II)
Justice	-.0454859	0.591	-.153506	0.320	(I)
Interior	-.1805372	0.020	.2581808	0.064	(II)
Defence	-.3422245	0.000	-.0904213	0.427	(II)
Finance	.0878899	0.282	.1804486	0.225	(I)
Education	.1928761	0.027	-.3259013	0.026	(III)
Agricult.	-.5728331	0.000	-.3375886	0.008	(III)
Trans./ Comm.	-.1861132	0.010	-.0424091	0.745	(II)
Trade/ Industry	-.163183	0.037	-.3094457	0.029	(III)
Soc.Pol/ Health	-.0906274	0.263	.1870667	0.210	(I)
Labour	-.0918136	0.204	-.0028102	0.983	(I)
Environm.	.5346525	0.000	.0954849	0.435	(II)

Results showed that there were less policy preference differences with the “own” new recruits than with the new recruits of other parties. This reinforced our hypothesis that policies influence voting choice behaviour.

The above nonetheless, is in conflict with the idea of Chong and Druckman (2007b, 104) that

“... sizable proportion of the general public could not even be said to hold meaningful attitudes. ... (I)t sometimes appeared that respondents chose their answers based on a flip of a coin.”

This is one reason we believe that examining particularly student voters and their behaviour is important. University students by definition have a higher educational background than the general public, hence better equipped to judge information dealing with policy issues.

In this research, we do not discuss, nor do we compare the current political preferences of student voters (i.e. in 2012/2013) vs. those in 2006/2007. Note however, that the political preferences of the general public in Finland have changed considerably since our survey was conducted. The most significant change is the current rise in popularity of the True Finns (Niemi, 2012). Also, because of the current European financial crisis, many policies of the government

¹⁴ To illustrate how Table 5 was compiled, in Table 6 we list comparisons of just one party (Centre party). All other party comparisons are available upon request

will continue to be scrutinised with increased vigour by the electorate, and thus have an influence on its voting behaviour.

In conclusion, our research offers several contributions. We investigate the connection of voting behaviour and policy issues of an important sub-group of voters, university students. In the future they will become decision makers in the public and private sector, and thus their opinions on governmental policies will most probably play a major role in their formulation and implementation. The data analysed is unique due to its sheer size, its coverage and the way policy preferences, particularly fiscal policies regarding Ministry expenditures are operationalized. Finally we utilize an uncommon methodology in measuring policy preferences, by matching and comparing preferences of loyal and new voters. This has assisted us in substantiating better the claim that policy issues play a role in voting behaviour.

References

- Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1995). Economics, issues and the Perot candidacy: Voter choice in the 1992 presidential election. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(3), 714–744.
- Betz, H.-G. (1994). *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Blais, A. (2000). *To vote or not to vote. The merits and limits of rational choice theory*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Pre.
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American voter*. New York: John Wiley.
- Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007a). Framing public opinion in competitive democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 101(04), 637–655.
- Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007b). Framing theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 103–126.
- Crotty, W. J. (1967). Democratic consensual norms and the college student. *Sociology of Education*, 40(3), 200–218.
- Dalton, R. J. (1999). Political support in advanced industrial democracies. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance* (pp. 57–77). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, R. J. (2000). The decline of party identification. In R. J. Dalton & M. P. Wattenberg (Eds.), *Parties without partisans: Political change in advanced industrial democracies* (pp. 19–36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Degutis, M. (2000). How Lithuanian voters decide: Reasons behind the party choice. *Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook*(1), 69–111.
- Denver, D., & Hands, G. (1990). Issues, principles or ideology? How young voters decide. *Electoral Studies*, 9(1), 19–36.
- Dow, J. K., & Endersby, J. W. (2004). Multinomial probit and multinomial logit: A comparison of choice models for voting research. *Electoral Studies*, 23(1), 107–122.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Druckman, J. N. (2004). Political preference formation: Competition, deliberation, and the (ir) relevance of framing effects. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4), 671–686.
- Dunleavy, P. (1979). The urban basis of political alignment: Social class, domestic property ownership and state intervention in consumption processes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 9(4), 409–443.
- Egerton, M. (2002). Political partisanship, voting abstention and higher education: Changing preferences in a British youth cohort in the 1990s. *Higher Education Quarterly*, 56(2), 156–177.
- Elo, K., & Rapeli, L. (2010). Determinants of political knowledge: The effects of the media on knowledge and information. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 20(1), 133–146.
- Evans, J. A. J. (2003). Ideology and party identification: A normalisation of French voting anchors? In M. S. Lewis-Beck (Ed.), *The French voter: Before and after the 2002 elections* (pp. 47–73). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Evans, J. A. J. (2004). *Voters and voting: An introduction*. London: Sage Publications.
- Franklin, M. N., & Page, E. C. (1984). A critique of the consumption cleavage approach in British voting studies. *Political Studies*, 32(4), 521–536.
- Glaeser, E. L., Ponzetto, G. A. M., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Why does democracy need education? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(2), 77–99.
- Harrop, M., & Miller, W. L. (1987). *Elections and voters. AV comparative introduction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Heath, A. F., Jowell, R., & Curtice, J. (1993). *Understanding political change. The British voter 1964-1987*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Forrest, S. (2005). Uninterested youth? Young people's attitudes towards party politics in Britain. *Political Studies*, 53(3), 556–578.
- Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1988). *Economics and elections*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lipset, S. M., & Altbach, P. G. (1966). Student politics and higher education in the United States. *Comparative Education Review*, 10(2), 320–349.
- Macdonald, S. E., Rabinowitz, G., & Listhaug, O. (1998). On attempting to rehabilitate the proximity model: Sometimes the patient just can't be helped. *Journal of Politics*, 60, 653–690.
- Milligan, K., Moretti, E., & Oreopoulos, P. (2004). Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. *Journal of Public Economics*, 88(9-10), 1667–1695.
- Niemi, M. K. (2012). Messenger and defender – Timo Soini's populist leadership and media strategies in winning the elections of 2011. *Research on Finnish Society*, 5, 7–17.
- Nogee, P., & Levin, M. B. (1958). Some determinants of political attitudes among college voters. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22(1), 449–463.

- Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Papageorgiou, A. (2010). Simulation analysis of the effect of party identification on Finnish parties' optimal positions. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 33(3), 224–247.
- Schmitt-Beck, R., Weick, S., & Christoph, B. (2006). Shaky attachments: Individual-level stability and change of partisanship among West German voters, 1984–2001. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(4), 581–608.
- Söderlund, P. (2008). Retrospective voting and electoral volatility: A Nordic perspective. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 31(2), 217–240.
- Sheehan, K. B. (2001). E-mail survey response rates: A review. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 6(2), 0–0.
- Sigel, R. S. (Ed.). (1989). *Political learning in adulthood: A sourcebook of theory and research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Venetoklis, T. (2006). *Guide to FUSSEP (Finnish university students socio-economic preferences) 2005 round* (Discussion paper No. 404). Helsinki: Government Institute for Economic Research.
- Venetoklis, T. (2007). Measuring distributive justice preferences of Finnish university students via the state budget. *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research*, 51(5), 435–454.
- Youniss, J., & Levine, P. (Eds.). (2009). *Engaging young people in civic life*. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press.